

Crime Detection and
Prevention Series
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Policing Racially Motivated Incidents

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Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series

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Foreword

Racial harassment and racial violence have implications not only for the immediate victim but also for the wider community, in that they contribute to a general fear of victimisation. The way in which the police respond to individual racial incidents is therefore likely to inform ethnic minority communities' general confidence in the police. Of particular relevance will be the way in which the police identify and deal with perpetrators, whether the incident consisted of racial abuse, criminal damage, violent assault or murder. This aspect of policing racial incidents therefore has critical implications for police-community relations.

This paper describes research which for the first time attempts to classify the 13,000 or so racially motivated incidents recorded by the police each year into types of crime, and to identify outcomes. As such it is important in explaining how incidents are dealt with by the police, and in recommending how their response might be amended in order to reflect more closely the aspirations of victims. The report can be referred to by managers and front line officers alike in dealing with racially motivated incidents in the future.

S W BOYS SMITH
Director of Police Policy
Home Office
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Most of all, though, we would like to thank all those officers who found the time during their busy shifts to be interviewed and who spoke so frankly about their experiences with this difficult area of policing.

The Authors

Warwick Maynard and Tim Read are both members of the Home Office Police Research Group.

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Executive summary

This research comprised, firstly, of a national survey of all 43 police forces in England and Wales in order to obtain basic information about the types of crime and methods of disposal which accounted for the 13,000 or so racially motivated incidents recorded by the police in 1996/97. This was followed up by visits to four forces where officers were interviewed in depth about their processing of 88 cases. The results of the research revealed the following:

There is a large degree of variation between forces in what is actually recorded and counted. A handful of forces were unable to provide us with any of the data we requested; many more found it necessary to clarify the categories we employed as the way they retained their data did not easily translate into what we were asking for. In addition, each force has developed its own form(s) for recording racially motivated incidents. It would make sense for a standard form to be introduced nationally to record racially motivated incidents and for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Home Office to consider clarifying the definition of a racially motivated incident in order to encourage less variation between forces, divisions and individual officers.

The bulk of racially motivated incidents are accounted for by less serious types of crime: 58% of incidents in our survey were either damage to property or verbal harassment. Officers must be made aware that racially motivated incidents are more likely to take the form of these less serious types of crime rather than assaults or more serious crimes, and it is these types of incident which they should be equipped to deal with.

Few incidents resulted in perpetrators facing formal sanction. After discounting those cases where there was little chance of identifying a suspect, only just over a third of cases with the potential to, actually resulted in a charge or a caution. The other two-thirds were disposed of by informal means, around half at the behest of the victim and the other half on the advice of the police. Clearly there is a need to address the issue of this rate of attrition. Front-line police officers, their supervisors and the Crown Prosecution Service should usually, where the victim wishes it, allow cases of racially motivated incidents to result in a charge. Officers should not in any event discourage victims from bringing charges in favour of administering informal warnings, particularly in cases where repeat victimisation is an issue. This is entirely commensurate with the view that incidents of racial harassment, at whatever level, will not be tolerated by the police service. It also sits well with the 'zero tolerance' approach, whereby calling a halt to what some may view as trivial incidents may well result in a reduction in the number of more serious incidents occurring.

Two divisions we visited had decided to include dealing with racially motivated incidents as a priority in their policing plans, and this appeared to have some value in focusing officers' attention on the problem. However, prioritising does not necessarily have to mean deploying a limited number of officers to full-time specialist teams, and managers should be aware of the problems which may arise if racially motivated incidents become marginalised from mainstream front-line policing.

We found that officers who had received specific training in how to handle racially motivated incidents were more aware of the available legislation, particularly section 4A of the Public Order Act. Multi-cultural awareness training had also probably achieved more good than harm. Forces should consider instituting both types of training: to explain the legislation available and the procedures employed in dealing with racially motivated incidents, and in multi-cultural awareness in order to be more cognisant of what members of particular ethnic minority groups might find offensive.

We found very few officers who were completely aware of the provisions of section 4A of the Public Order Act, many being confused about what it could be used to deal with. The Home Office should consider revising the current guidance relating to section 4A of the Public Order Act to make more obvious to front-line officers the circumstances of racial verbal abuse in which it can be applied.

The Home Office should consider carefully the wording of any new offence of racially motivated violence, or guidance relating to it, in order to counter two sets of worries expressed by some officers: that not being able to prove 'motivation' should not provide an opportunity for the case to be lost; and that prosecutions under the offence must be seen to be able to be brought with white as well as with ethnic minority victims. The potential difficulty of proving motivation is recognised in the government's recent consultation paper on new statutory offences for racial crime, with the proposal that alternative verdicts should be permitted if the racial element is unproven.

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1. Introduction

Background

The Home Office has for over a decade included in various research programmes studies which have considered contact between ethnic minorities and the criminal justice system, whether as suspects or as victims (see, for example, Home Office, 1981, Sampson and Phillips, 1992 and 1995, FitzGerald, 1993, FitzGerald and Hale, 1996). Research undertaken by the Research and Statistics Directorate examined the discrepancies between estimates of the number of racially motivated crimes reported to the police suggested by the British Crime Survey and the number actually recorded (FitzGerald and Hale, 1996). The Home Office is currently also looking at the question of police recording of racial incidents (Sibbitt, forthcoming).

This study by the Police Research Group complements that work by examining the way the police process those racial incidents which they do record. It considers in particular differences in charging routes – in terms of both whether or not a charge or a caution was brought at all, *and* for what offences – which is the subject of this report. The ACPO definition of a racially motivated incident is

“any incident in which it appears to the reporting or investigating officer that the complaint involves an element of racial motivation, or any incident which includes an allegation of racial motivation made by any person.”

Methodology and structure of the report

The research, which was carried out between 1 April and 12 September 1997, comprised two elements:

- a postal survey of all forces, requesting data on the breakdown of all recorded racially motivated incidents for the year 1 April 1996 to 31 March 1997. Discussion of the results of this survey is contained in section 2.
- scrutiny of a sample of cases in three provincial forces – Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Sussex – and in the Forest Gate division of the Metropolitan Police, by looking at police paperwork and interviewing the officers involved in each case. These forces and divisions were chosen on the basis of their having a sufficient number of cases, information about the incident category and its disposal to allow a meaningful sample to be drawn. Discussion of the results of the scrutiny of these cases and the interviews is contained in section 3.

Section 4 of the report draws together some general conclusions and makes recommendations.

2. Patterns of racially motivated incidents

We issued a postal survey in early April 1997, asking for a response within three weeks. We asked for details of racially motivated incidents (RMIs) recorded by all 43 police forces in England and Wales. At this time, forces were in the process of preparing their annual return, which consists of the single figure of the total number of RMIs recorded in each force, to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), but with a much later deadline. Our analysis is thus based on forces' provisional figures for 1996/97 which do not tally exactly with the HMIC total – now published – for all forces.

We asked for the details of RMIs to be broken down into seven crime type groupings: serious crime against the person, assaults, robbery, theft and burglary, damage to property offences, verbal harassment and abusive behaviour, and other incidents. In order to ensure consistency in coding, guidance on which categories specific incidents should be recorded was provided to forces, although there were a number of incidents that did not fit easily into the framework provided, and which forces had to refer to the researchers. Within these categories forces were asked to provide information about the outcome of these incidents (subsequently referred to as the 'charging route'). The following outcomes were available:-

- Charged
- Cautioned
- Warning
- Detected, but no further police action (NFPA)
- Undetected
- Report / Awaiting result (i.e., undecided as yet on charging route)
- Unknown.

Where the incident had resulted in a charge, the police were asked to provide further information about the outcome of the case ('awaiting result', 'discontinued', 'guilty' or 'not guilty'). In addition police forces were asked to provide some aggregate data about their racially motivated incidents: whether or not the racially motivated incident was a repeat, and the ethnic origin of the victim, and of the offender (where known).

A number of police forces were unable to provide figures to the level of detail requested. Six forces (Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Kent, Cheshire, Thames Valley and West Midlands) were able to provide us with no further breakdown than the total number of RMIs for the year, although the first three also provided details of repeat victimisation and the ethnic composition of victims and offenders.

The Metropolitan Police recorded data related to the 'suspect' rather than the offender, whereas West Yorkshire Police had separate categories for both offenders and suspects. These data, however, were not linked to specific incidents so cannot be subjected to any detailed analysis.

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Hampshire, Hertfordshire and Surrey were able to provide us with the total number of RMIs during the period, but could give no breakdown for the individual groupings. A number of other forces (Cambridgeshire, Dorset, Essex, Humberside, Metropolitan (Met), Northumbria, South Wales and South Yorkshire), while able to give us sub-totals for the various groupings were unable to provide us with information about how the incident had been disposed. Other forces (Staffordshire, Lancashire) were able to give us details of how incidents in certain categories had been disposed, but not in others.

Most forces were able to supply us with data for the period requested. Of the eight forces which could not, five were able to provide us with 12 months worth of data, for the calendar year 1996 rather than for the financial year 1996/97. The other three were the Metropolitan Police, whose disaggregated figures relate to a six month period from 1/10/96 to 31/3/97 (although we have a total figure for the whole year), and Derbyshire, who provided us with 14 months worth of data (1/4/96 to 12/6/97). Sussex were able to provide us with incident data for the period requested, but the information on the ethnicity of the victim/offender and details of repeat victimisation is for the four months from 1/1/97 to 1/5/97.


In summary, although the postal survey was designed in anticipation that the type of data required would be readily available to the police and would not require a great deal of additional work on their part to collate, in the event it appeared that a number of forces struggled to provide data in the form required.

Overall patterns of racially motivated incidents

The response to our survey showed that the police recorded 13,016 racially motivated incidents between 1 April 1996 and 31 March 1997. (The official HMIC figures collected slightly later put the figure at 13,106.) Figure 1 displays the number of racially motivated incidents recorded in each force.

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Figure 1: Number of racially motivated incidents



In recognition of the uneven distribution of ethnic minority populations across police force areas, a racially motivated incident rate has been calculated for each force. This divides the number of racially motivated incidents by the ethnic minority population (in '000s) in each police force area. Whilst this gives a rough and ready way of displaying differences from 'expected' rates of victimisation, it masks differences between different ethnic minority groups, and the fact that that victims of racially motivated incidents can also be white. The results are shown in figure 2.

The RMI rate per 1000 ethnic minority population varies across forces from two or less (Lincolnshire, Durham, City of London, and Bedfordshire) up to almost 23 (Northumbria), with an average of 6.8. The rate is a more sensitive indicator of the problem of racially motivated incidents than the raw numbers because it takes account of the context within which each force is operating. There are, for example, a number of police forces which are responsible for the reporting of a large number of racially motivated incidents. When, however, these figures are expressed as a proportion of the ethnic minority population policed, a different picture emerges. Forces such as the Metropolitan Police, West Yorkshire (624 incidents) and Leicestershire (299) all have RMI rates under four. Northumbria, on the other hand, is responsible both for a large number of incidents (488) and a high RMI rate.

Conversely there are a number of police forces which, whilst not recording high numbers of racially motivated incidents, appear to be experiencing a disproportionate number of such incidents bearing in mind the size of their ethnic minority population. Cumbria is one such force (39 incidents, a RMI rate of 19.5), as are Dorset (70 and 10.4) and Gwent (78 and 11.5).

Racially motivated incidents and repeat victimisation

A total of 25 forces were able to specify whether or not the victim of a racially motivated incident was a repeat victim. The highest proportion of repeat victims was in Cumbria, where 38% of victims had been the subject of a recorded racially motivated incident previously (15 of 39). West Yorkshire was the next highest with a figure of 32% (202 out of a total of 623 victims).


Those forces with the lowest recorded rates of repeat victimisation include Devon & Cornwall (1%, 1 of 81) and Nottinghamshire (3%, 12 of 349).

Patterns for individual offence types

In all, 34 forces were able to provide us with a breakdown into our seven offence type groupings which their recorded RMIs covered. The Metropolitan Police was only able to provide these data for the latter half of the year, reducing its total from 5,621 to 2,661 for the purpose of the following analysis.

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Figure 2: Racially motivated incidents per '000 ethnic minority population



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Table 1 shows the overall pattern of racially motivated incidents where the incident category was known. It also provides the percentage of incidents where an offender was charged across the various categories.

Table 1: Overall patterns of racially motivated incidents

	Number where type of crime known	% of all where type of crime known	Number where disposal route known	Number detected	% detected where disposal route known	Number charged/cautioned	% charged/cautioned where detected
Serious crime	159	2%	65	50	77%	27	54%
Assault	1607	21%	639	478	75%	277	58%
Robbery	68	1%	35	8	23%	5	62%
Theft/burglary	139	2%	61	10	16%	7	70%
Damage to property	1498	20%	677	315	47%	144	46%
Verbal abuse	2871	38%	1535	1147	75%	350	31%
Other	1231	16%	281	166	59%	32	19%
Total	7573	100%	3293	2174	66%	842	39%

In order to contextualise these figures the rates need to be compared with the latest published data for all offences. These data are not strictly comparable since the data published by the Home Office are subject to guidelines on clear-up procedures, and thus 'clear-ups' will not, for example, include incidents which were dealt with by means of a warning. In our survey, on the other hand, our 'detected' column includes all those incidents where a suspect was identified, no matter what subsequent action was taken. Nevertheless, the data are likely to be robust enough for the purpose of general comparison between rates of detection and of charging/cautioning between racial and non-racial incidents. In addition, the type of crime groupings used in the published data are not quite the same as, but approximate to, those used in our survey; unfortunately data are not available for public order offences (which cover the verbal abuse grouping in our survey) or for 'other' offences. It should also be remembered that the figures and rates in table 1 are based on returns from 34 of the 43 police forces in England and Wales so are not strictly generalisable.

Nevertheless, the figures displayed in table 2 suggest that racially motivated incidents are rather more likely to be cleared up than non-racially motivated incidents, but are rather less likely to result in a charge or a caution. The largest discrepancies are in the comparatively high detection rate for RMIs in cases of

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damage to property (criminal damage) – 47% as opposed to 19% – and comparatively low detection rate for RMIs in cases of verbal abuse (public order offences) – 75% as opposed to 95%. With charging rates, detected racially motivated burglaries are the only crime type more likely to result in a charge or caution than their non-racial counterparts, but here we are only dealing with ten cases. Overall charging rates were 39% for racially motivated incidents, as opposed to 58% for non-racially motivated, although the latter figure does not include the important verbal abuse (and other public order) grouping. It is important to note that some (and possibly most) of this variation will certainly be due to the fact that informal means of disposal are not included in the base for non-racially motivated figures.

Table 2: Percentages of notifiable offences cleared up and charged/cautioned

	% cleared up	% charged/cautioned where detected
Sexual offences	76%	70%
Violence against the person	77%	68%
Robbery	23%	68%
Burglary/theft/handling	22%	51%
Criminal damage	19%	66%
Public order offences	95%	N/A
Other	60%	N/A
TOTAL	26%	58%

Source: Criminal Statistics England and Wales, 1995

The remainder of this section looks at patterns of racially motivated incidents within the particular crime type groupings.

Serious crime against the person

Twenty forces did not record any racially motivated incidents which fell into the category of 'serious crime against the person'. For the remaining 13 forces the number of such incidents ranged from 1 to 45, with a total of 159 incidents (2% of the 7573 RMIs where the incident category was known). Unsurprisingly the highest figure was from the Metropolitan Police. More surprisingly the second highest figure, 31, was from Cambridgeshire Constabulary, a force with a much lower total of RMIs. In Cambridgeshire those RMIs classified as 'serious crime against the person' constituted 22% of all RMIs, compared to the Metropolitan Police's figure of 2%. Interestingly Norfolk and Essex, both of which adjoin Cambridgeshire, also appeared to have a disproportionate number of 'serious' RMIs, such incidents representing 12% and 9% of their total number of RMIs respectively. In order to ascertain

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whether or not the high proportion of serious crime RMIs in Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Essex simply reflected a large number of serious crime incidents in general for these forces, data from the 1996 Criminal Statistics were used to calculate what percentage of all crimes 'serious crime' represented. In all three forces serious crime represented less than 1.5% of all notifiable offences.

Analysis of the disposal of the racially motivated serious crime incidents is hampered by the fact that of the five forces which reported more than 10 incidents (Cambridgeshire, the Metropolitan Police, Essex, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire), only the last was able to provide details of disposals.

Assaults

There were 1607 RMIs recorded by police forces in the 'assaults' category, representing 21% of all RMIs where the incident category was known. Looking at individual forces, Devon and Cornwall appeared to have a disproportionately high number of 'assault' RMIs (35% of all racially motivated incidents). The figure was also high for the Metropolitan Police (30%) and for North Wales (38%, but only a small number of incidents, see below).

At the other end of the scale there were a number of forces for whom 'assaults' constituted a small proportion of all RMIs:

Northumbria	5%
Cambridgeshire	6%
Cleveland	9%

Looking at the disposal of these incidents it was noticeable that the percentage of incidents where charges had been brought varied widely across forces, from zero per cent in the City of London Police and North Wales Police, to 100% of incidents in Cumbria. However, these three forces recorded very small numbers of incidents: 1, 3 and 4 respectively. In order to ascertain whether the number of incidents influenced the proportion charged, average charge rates were produced for those forces with 20 or more such incidents, and for forces with fewer than 20 incidents. For the forces with 20 or more assault RMIs the average proportion charged was 39%, for forces with fewer than 20, the equivalent figure was 34%, showing that the number of incidents recorded did not greatly affect the charging rate.

Robbery

Figures were unavailable for South Yorkshire for this category. Of those forces that did provide data, twenty did not record any racial incidents under the 'Robbery' classification. In the remaining 12 forces the number of 'robbery' RMIs ranged from 1 to 21, with a total of 68 incidents (just under 1% of all RMIs where the incident

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classification was known). The highest figure was again from the Metropolitan Police (21), but this figure accounted for less than one percent of their RMIs overall. In comparison, Sussex's 14 incidents represented 5.4% of their total number of racially motivated incidents. By comparison, from the 1996 Criminal Statistics data, robberies accounted for only 0.6% of Sussex's crimes overall.

Cambridgeshire and City of London forces also had a disproportionately high number of these incidents, which represented 6% and 12% of all their RMIs (although in the latter's case, the small number of incidents (8) is somewhat misleading). In all other forces where data were available the figure was under 2%.

Only nine forces were able to provide data on the outcome of these incidents. Overall, these show that 77% of robbery incidents went undetected. Within individual forces the detection rate ranged from 100% (two forces) to zero per cent (four forces).

Theft/Burglary

Fifteen forces had not recorded any RMIs that could be classified as 'theft/burglary'. The remaining seventeen forces recorded figures ranging from 1 to 54 with a total of 139 incidents (2% of total incidents), the Metropolitan Police again experiencing the largest number of incidents (54).

Forces displaying a disproportionate number of 'thefts/burglaries' in relation to RMIs overall include Sussex (14% of its RMIs classified as thefts, 37 incidents), North Yorkshire (7%, but only 3 cases) and Cambridgeshire (5%, 7 cases). In comparison, the Metropolitan Police's figure was 2%, with all other forces' figures being below 4%. The 14% of Sussex's RMIs which were categorised as theft or burglary offences compares to an overall figure (1996 Criminal Statistics data) which indicates that crimes in this category account for over two-thirds of Sussex's total crime.

Looking at the outcome of theft/burglary RMIs, the proportion of incidents which were undetected was again high (84% for the 11 forces where data was available). Again there was a great deal of variation across individual forces, the detection rate varying from zero to 100 per cent.

Damage to property

Only three forces recorded no racially motivated incidents which fell into the 'damage to property' category. The remaining thirty recorded numbers ranging from 2 to 577, giving a total of 1498 incidents (20% of RMIs where incident category known). As is to be expected the Metropolitan Police recorded the largest number of incidents, which incidentally accounts for one of the highest proportions of all RMIs within the force (22%).

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Racially motivated incidents that could be classified as 'damage to property' typically accounted for around 15 – 25% of a forces total number of racially motivated incidents (mean percentage = 18.8%, median = 20%). However, there were a number of forces that differed from this pattern. Sixty-two percent of all RMIs for North Wales were classified as 'damage to property' (admittedly only 5 from 8 incidents), while in Humberside the figure was 40% (22 of 55 incidents). At the other end of the scale, in Dorset these incidents accounted for only 4% of all RMIs. Analysis of data from the 1996 Criminal Statistics indicates that, for both Humberside and Dorset, damage to property accounts for just over 15% of crime overall.

Information about the disposal of these incidents was available from 20 forces. Overall 17% of incidents were charged. It is noticeable, however, that those forces with the highest 'charge rate' (over 40%) tend to be relatively small forces with a small number of incidents (Dyfed Powys, West Mercia, Wiltshire and Gwent).

Verbal harassment/abusive behaviour

Forces classified a total of 2871 racially motivated incidents as 'verbal harassment/abusive behaviour'. This represented 38% of the overall number of incidents where an incident category could be defined, comfortably the largest single category of incidents. The number of incidents ranged from zero (Durham and Lincolnshire) to 408 (Northumbria). The average number of incidents per force was 87.

As a proportion of the total number of RMIs, incidents in the 'verbal harassment' category ranged widely across forces from zero per cent (North Wales) to 84% (Northumbria). Forces with a particularly low or high proportion of incidents in this category were:

North Wales	0% (with only 8 incidents in total)
Metropolitan Police	12% (322 of 2661)
Devon & Cornwall	14% (11 of 81)
Lancashire	73% (177 of 242)
North Yorkshire	76% (35 of 46)
Northumbria	84% (408 of 488)

It is noticeable, looking at the disposal of these incidents that the percentage of cases which had been deemed to require 'no further police action' (NFPA) varied widely across police forces. In a number of forces well over 50% of such incidents were treated in this manner (Wiltshire 50%, Avon and Somerset 62%, Cleveland 62%, Bedfordshire 65%, Norfolk 74% and North Yorkshire 86%.) By contrast there were a number of forces where the percentage of incidents recorded as NFPA was below 20% (Cumbria 13%, Devon and Cornwall 18%, Dyfed Powys 18%, Leicestershire 20%, Suffolk 17%, Warwickshire 3%, and West Yorkshire 14%).

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This pattern led to similar variations across forces in the percentage of incidents where charges had been brought (an average of 13%, ranging from 0% to 64%) and those which remained undetected (ranging from 100% to 6%).

These are the type of incidents where one would expect the police to employ sections 4, 4A, and 5 of the Public Order Act. Section 4A had been introduced in February 1995 specifically to deal with incidents of racial verbal abuse (details of these sections of the Public Order Act are contained in appendix 1). Home Office statistics, however, reveal that only 100 prosecutions were brought under the new section in England and Wales in 1995. This is clearly only a small proportion of the total number of incidents of verbal harassment found in this study.

Consequently one of the main aims of this research was to examine how racially motivated incidents in general and particularly those involving verbal harassment were investigated by the police. While the national survey shows interesting variations across police forces in relation to their handling of verbal harassment, and other offence types, it cannot explain why these variations occur. The aim of the next stage of the research, interviews with front-line officers, was to try and explain why these outcomes might be occurring.

3. The police response

Selection of cases analysed and officers interviewed

On the basis of the patterns revealed by the results of the postal survey and discussed in section 2 above, we selected four forces in which to draw a sample of cases for in-depth analysis. These were Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Sussex and the Forest Gate division of the Metropolitan Police. The decision to include the Metropolitan Police in the analysis was taken because the force accounts for such a high proportion of all RMIs. The selection criteria for the other three forces were that they should have a sufficient number of racially motivated incidents to allow a suitable sample to be drawn taking into account details of the category of the incident and its disposal. It should be stressed that this report is only concerned with racially motivated incidents that had been reported to, and recorded by, the police. A discussion about the recording of RMIs is contained in Sibbitt (forthcoming).

We initially requested each force headquarters (or in the case of Forest Gate the divisional) Race and Community Unit (or equivalent) to select a random sample of incidents logged on its database in the last year, and to arrange for us to interview the officer who had dealt with each case. In Forest Gate and Leicestershire this sample was drawn from anywhere in the division/force. In Nottinghamshire we restricted the sample to being drawn from three of the ten divisions, and in Sussex to five of the nine divisions. However, some way into the research we felt that this was not giving a sufficient number of cases which had been capable of being potentially followed through to a prosecution or a caution – put simply, those where an offender had been identified and could have been apprehended – and so in Nottinghamshire we boosted the sample of cases where this could have occurred by requesting that the entire sample consisted of detected cases only. (Although we actually picked up four undetected cases in Nottinghamshire out of 34.)

In the three provincial forces, cases were selected to ensure that there should be some from divisions (or, in Leicestershire, Local Policing Units (LPUs)) which covered rural as well as urban areas. In practice, however, this only yielded genuinely rural locations in Leicestershire since in the other two forces all the incidents selected had occurred in the urban areas of divisions with rural parts. In Leicestershire, a total of five interviews were conducted where the incident had occurred outside a major urban area.

The discussion which follows is therefore based upon interviews which discussed 88 cases conducted with 73 officers, since in two of the four areas the sampling process selected more than one case dealt with by the same officer. The distribution among the four forces is shown in table 3.

Table 3: Numbers of cases analysed and officers interviewed

	Number of cases	Number of officers
Leicestershire	17	17
Nottinghamshire	34	24
Sussex	21	21
Forest Gate (Metropolitan Police)	16	11
Totals	88	73

Interviewees were a mixture of beat and patrol officers in all four forces, and table 4 shows their distribution between ranks for each force.

Table 4: Rank of officers interviewed

	Sergeants	Constables
Leicestershire	3	14
Nottinghamshire	2	22
Sussex	1	20*
Forest Gate (Metropolitan Police)	1	10
Totals	7	66

Note: * the constable figure for Sussex includes one civilian working in a team handling incidents not requiring a personal response

In addition to asking each officer in some detail about the selected incident(s), all were asked questions about policing racially motivated incidents and ethnic minority communities more generally, drawing on their experience of dealing with the many more racially motivated incidents they had encountered during their service as police officers. This latter number is likely to run into many hundreds given the long service (five years or more) of around half the officers, and that the majority were stationed in urban areas with disproportionately high ethnic minority populations.

Force/divisional procedures for dealing with racially motivated incidents

There was some variation between the four forces in the way in which racially motivated incidents were processed. This section describes that variation in order to put the following discussion of officers' perceptions into context.

In Leicestershire and Sussex, and in two of the three divisions we visited in Nottinghamshire, the normal procedure for dealing with racially motivated incidents did not differ from that employed when dealing with any other incident, save that the officer had to fill in an additional form which would be stored with the case file and copied to the headquarters Race and Community Unit. Policy in all three forces was that the outcome of any investigation would be supervised at at least Inspector level, and that it would be dealt with more quickly than a similar non-racial incident. In these forces and divisions, the officer first attending would be the officer who followed through with any subsequent investigation and would deal with the case in its entirety, unless the crime was deemed serious enough to be dealt with by CID. Exceptions to this were that in the Nottinghamshire divisions a remarkably high number of cases were handed over from one shift to another, possibly reflecting the shift system in operation; and in one of the Sussex divisions, low priority calls were dealt with by a mixed police officer and civilian office-based unit over the telephone which occasionally required a locally based officer to call in person to collect additional information. Having said this, it was unusual for racially motivated incidents to be graded at this level. It is also worth noting that Sussex Police had been running a special operation during this period to counter the increase in street robberies aimed at foreign students.

In the remaining Nottinghamshire division (Radford Road) and in the Forest Gate division of the Metropolitan Police, different procedures applied. Both these divisions had made dealing with racially motivated incidents a priority in their area policing plans, and had therefore set up different procedures both for monitoring and for processing cases.

In Forest Gate, the officer first attending took initial details of the incident, but subsequently handed it over for any further investigation and follow-up to one of two full-time officers who comprised the divisional Racial Incident Section (RIS). All subsequent investigation and follow-up was conducted by them.

In Radford Road, the procedure for the officer first attending was similar, but rather than handing the case over to the RIS, it was handed to the local beat officer (PBO) for subsequent investigation and follow-up. In addition, a single officer was responsible (besides his other duties) for collating and monitoring data on all racially motivated incidents which had taken place on the division. In the analysis which follows we have separated the Radford Road cases ($n=15$) and officers ($n=10$) from those for the remainder of Nottinghamshire ($n=19$ and $n=15$ respectively). For ease of reading "Nottinghamshire" should be read as meaning "rest of Nottinghamshire"; we refer to "five areas" throughout meaning the three forces plus Forest Gate and Radford Road.

Officers' perceptions of case circumstances

Classifying and recording incidents as 'racially motivated'

Whilst this report does not address issues of under-recording, one phenomenon which might be viewed as 'misrecording' that we came across on a number of occasions is worthy of note. In all five areas we found cases which had been classified as a racially motivated incident of criminal damage or assault or robbery or some 'substantive' offence other than verbal abuse. On interviewing the officer, however, it became apparent in some cases that the recorded offence was probably not racially motivated, and that the incident was recorded as one in which there was a racial element due to the verbal abuse which followed. One example of this was where a foreign visitor was the victim of a street robbery (with no discernible racial motivation), but on returning to his guest house was aided by his landlady in identifying the suspect. The landlady then became the victim of racial verbal abuse from the suspect's common law wife who was a neighbour. The incident was recorded as a racially motivated robbery; charges were brought by the police for the robbery, and although the verbal abuse was referred to in officer and witness statements, it was not recorded, much less charged. In our view the robbery should not have been recorded as a racially motivated incident, but the verbal abuse should have been.

In other cases, even where the 'substantive' offence and the verbal abuse occurred concurrently and by the same perpetrator, the incident was often recorded without mention of the verbal abuse element. Clearly this has implications for what charges are brought: in a number of cases charges were brought for, say, criminal damage or assault but not for the verbal abuse as well. Reasons given for this were that there was little point since the original offence carried a higher penalty anyway, or that section 4A of the Public Order Act was unwieldy to use – an issue we return to towards the end of this section.

Of the 88 incidents we talked about at length with officers, 51 had been alleged to be racially motivated by the victim, 21 by the officer first attending and 16 by a third party (most of these by the local authority housing department). In around half of these last 37 cases, officers recalled the victim disputing that the incident had been racially motivated and being more concerned with the police either pursuing or preventing a repeat of the 'substantive' offence – no matter what type of crime – than with convincing the officer of any racial motivation. Officers confirmed that this pattern was repeated with other incidents they had dealt with in the last year. The distribution of who made the original allegation that the incident was racially motivated between the five areas is shown in table 5.

Table 5: Who alleged the incident was racially motivated?

	Victim	Officer	Third party
Forest Gate (Met)	9	3	4
Radford Road (Notts)	9	3	3
Nottinghamshire	12	6	1
Leicestershire	12	3	2
Sussex	9	6	6
Totals	51	21	16

There were only 9 cases overall where the officer disagreed with the victim's view that a racially motivated incident had taken place, and in half of these there seemed to us to be reasonable grounds for this. In one case, for example, a known member of the British National Party reported that he found a poster displayed in a local bookshop window advertising Africa Liberation Day both offensive and racist: the officer decided that there was no charge to answer. In a second category of cases there was doubt in officers' minds that the alleged incidents – in one case graffiti and in others verbal harassment – had taken place at all and more than one officer opined that victims' reasons for reporting these were because they wanted the local authority housing department to move them. In the graffiti case a period of surveillance subsequent to the report of the initial incident revealed nothing.

In a third category of cases, however, there was no dispute that an incident had taken place. Officers were of the opinion, however, that had the victim been white, the white offender would have insulted him or her verbally in some other way than making reference to skin colour. Typically in these cases, victim and offender had been neighbours or otherwise known to each other for some time; officers believed that an assault or verbal abuse would have occurred anyway no matter what the ethnic origin of offender and victim: the officer's opinion was, therefore, that the incident was not racially motivated.

This view – that where the perpetrator and the victim were already known to each other, the incident might well have occurred had they been from the same ethnic group – was given by several officers, though very few suggested that these incidents should go unrecorded as racially motivated. This calls into question the use of the term 'racially **motivated**' in relation to such incidents, though the racial element might well cause further distress to the victim.

There is thus a mismatch, in a limited number of cases, between how these incidents are recorded and what front-line officers **feel** is the reality of the situation. In terms of action taken, even those where the officer felt that the incident was not racially motivated **were** recorded as racial incidents.

Charging routes

An area of particular concern for this research was to ascertain to what extent recorded racially motivated incidents proceed to a charge or a caution. Section 2 gives national data, and this section attempts to explain, with reference to individual cases, the reasons for these relatively low prosecution (i.e. charging) and caution rates. Table 6 shows in how many of the 88 cases we interviewed officers about there was no doubt that an incident had occurred, and a suspect was available (we have referred to these cases as “detected” whether or not they resulted in a prosecution or a caution), and of these how many went on to result in a charge or a caution.

	All cases	Detected	Charged	Cautioned
Forest Gate (Met)	16	6	0	0
Radford Road (Notts)	15	13	3	0
Nottinghamshire	19	17	8	0
Leicestershire	17	10	4	1
Sussex	21	13	5	1
Totals	88	59	20	2

It is not possible from table 6 to compare detection rates for the five areas because of the way in which the sample was selected. The small numbers involved would also make such a comparison unreliable. The pattern, however, for the four forces above in terms of detection and charge/caution rates is similar to that found in section 2 (59 of 88 cases detected, 67%, compared to a figure of 66% in section 2, and 22 of 59 cases charged or cautioned, 37%, compared to a figure of 39% in section 2). Figure 3 shows the ‘attrition rate’ for the four forces more clearly.

Figure 3: Detected, charged and cautioned cases



The shortfall between the total number of cases and those detected is, of course, most easily explained by the absence of any suspect. The shortfall between detected cases – i.e. those where a suspect had been identified – and those where either a prosecution or a caution followed is, at first sight, more cause for concern. Table 7 gives a breakdown of reasons for the 37 cases where this occurred.

Table 7: Reasons for not charging or cautioning detected cases

	Detected cases	Not charged/ cautioned	Victim's wishes	Police advice
Forest Gate (Met)	6	6	2	4
Radford Road (Notts)	13	10	7	3
Nottinghamshire	17	9	5	4
Leicestershire	10	5	4	1
Sussex	13	7	2	5
Totals	59	37	20	17*

Note: * This figure includes five cases which officers initially wished to charge but after referral to the CPS for advice resulted in no case being taken forward.

THE POLICE RESPONSE

In most cases (n=20) the reason for charges not being pressed was because the victim wanted the officer to administer an informal warning to the perpetrator(s) and not to pursue the case formally. This was particularly true in those cases where the perpetrator(s) were juveniles. Officers' views on the reasons for this reluctance to carry through to a prosecution were difficult to uncover though – importantly – only two involved fear of reprisals. Most victims simply wanted the offenders' behaviour to cease – which officers thought was their main motive for calling the police – but would rather some other (informal) action was taken. This was even true (initially) of two police officers who had been victims of racial abuse whilst involved in arresting or processing suspects for other (non-racial) offences.

In the remaining 17 cases, charges were not brought on the advice of the officer. In 7 cases this was due to the incident being part of a pattern of continuing harassment between two parties and where counter allegations either had been or were likely to be made: 3 of the 4 incidents where this occurred in Forest Gate in fact involved the same two families, though the incidents occurred over a protracted period and were dealt with at different times by different officers.

In the other 10 cases charges were not brought either due to officers' perceptions of lack of evidence or that – in their view – the incident would better be sorted out by informal means. 'Lack of evidence' covered cases both where there was doubt that the incident (usually verbal harassment) had taken place at all, or that the uncorroborated identification evidence of the victim would stand up in court: three of the cases not charged on the advice of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) were for this reason. The use of an informal warning (or 'advising' the perpetrator) occurred in nearly all detected cases of verbal harassment where the perpetrators were juveniles.

Nearly all officers thought that – as with most types of crime generally – it should be up to the victim to decide upon the means of disposal of the case and whether or not charges should be pressed. A small minority suggested that their force should think about adopting the policy in dealing with racially motivated incidents that it had embraced to deal with domestic violence: that the police should press charges where it was clear that an offence had occurred and where the victim did not want to do so him- or herself.

Officers' general views

Training

Out of the total of 72 officers interviewed, 42 had received training on how to deal with racially motivated incidents – 25 of the 36 officers with six or fewer years service had undertaken relevant modules as part of their probationer training. Those

trained most recently had also received multi-cultural awareness training: in Leicestershire three had spent weekends living with ethnic minority families. Table 8 displays how many officers had received relevant training across the five areas.

Views on training ranged from “*excellent – very useful*” to “*unnecessary – you just have to be knowledgeable about what offences have been committed and treat everybody the same*”. One officer said that “*equal opportunities and multi-cultural aspects were shoved down our throats on too many occasions ... the training does not prepare you for the anti-police feelings you get from most ethnic minorities on the streets*”. Another three officers expressed views similar to this.

Table 8: Numbers of officers who had received training

	Total officers	Yes	No
Forest Gate (Met)	11	6	5
Radford Road (Notts)	10	6	4
Nottinghamshire	14	5	9
Leicestershire	17	11	6
Sussex	20*	14	7
Totals	72	42	31

Note: * The one civilian in Sussex who was interviewed was not asked general questions on the legislation or on training

In all five areas most officers had had to rely on force orders to keep them up to date with changes in legislation – such as the introduction of section 4A – and were understandably less confident when dealing with incidents where it might be used. Some officers thought that this was an inadequate way of disseminating information on any subject. However, more experienced officers certainly seemed to “know their patch” and those currently (or recently) stationed in areas with large ethnic minority populations had, for the most part, become multi-culturally aware through immersion in communities other than their own on a day to day basis.

Current legislation – offences under the Public Order Act

Brown (1994) has previously documented the considerable variation between forces in their use of the 1986 Public Order Act, in terms of types of crime which it is used for, as well as in terms of sheer numbers of prosecutions and cautions. Officers said that they felt far more confident when dealing with more serious racially motivated cases, such as those involving assault, since these were dealt with using legislation with which they were familiar, and the victim was more likely to want to prosecute.

THE POLICE RESPONSE

Nonetheless, nearly all the officers we interviewed (n=65) had used section 4 (causing fear or provocation of violence) of the Public Order Act (POA) in the last year, and the majority had used section 5 (offensive conduct). However, few (n=25) had used section 4A (causing intentional harassment) and even fewer (including one probationer present at an interview with another officer) volunteered without prompting that they knew that section 4A had been introduced and/or might be the appropriate charge when dealing with racially motivated incidents which consisted of verbal abuse. Table 9 shows the pattern of use of these sections of the POA across the five areas.

	Total officers	Used secs 4 or 5	Used sec 4A for racial incidents
Forest Gate (Met)	11	10	2
Radford Road (Notts)	10	6	4
Nottinghamshire	14	14	7
Leicestershire	17	15	4
Sussex	20*	20	8
Totals	72	65	25

Note: * The one civilian in Sussex who was interviewed was not asked general questions on the legislation or on training

There was some confusion over when section 4A might be used. The view was put by more than one officer that authorisation from the Director of Public Prosecutions was needed in order to charge a suspect under section 4A (a feature in fact of section 19, incitement to racial hatred). Generally, though, even those officers who were aware of the existence of the legislation were not convinced that the circumstances of verbal (racial) abuse they encountered fitted the criteria for prosecution under section 4A and, if the abuse was coupled with a more serious offence, preferred to charge only under the latter. One of the cases discontinued by the CPS was where the victim was a police officer being subjected to racial verbal abuse in the custody suite: the reason for their not proceeding was that the offence had not occurred in a public place, and this ruling deterred officers who were made aware of the case further from attempting to use section 4A.

Proposed new legislation – racially motivated violence

Officers were divided almost equally in their views over the proposal to introduce a new offence of “racially motivated violence”. Some thought that this would be giving the right signals to the communities they were trying to police (as well as to potential perpetrators) that such acts were taken very seriously. Others were worried, however, that attempting to prove the motivation for the violence to either magistrates or a jury might be problematic, and feared that cases might be lost on this basis. Some pointed out that motivation could currently be taken into consideration when sentence was passed.

A substantial minority of officers were of the view that introducing a new offence would be difficult to justify to the majority (white) population. A scenario was offered: where the white victim of a white offender would feel “hard done by” if the offender received a lesser sentence than the white offender of a black victim in the same circumstances. These officers – all of whom policed areas with relatively high ethnic minority populations – felt that there might be a “backlash” if such a law came into force.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

Each force has developed its own form(s) for recording racially motivated incidents; some are supplements to (and therefore only make sense when viewed with) crime report forms, others are standalone, and recording racially motivated incidents in some forces simply comprises ticking an additional field on computerised crime reporting systems. In a sense, these differences in ways of recording do not matter as much as variations in what exactly is recorded. Racially motivated incident forms from the three provincial forces we visited are reproduced at appendix 2 which reveal these differences – for example Leicestershire employs a seven-way classification of ethnic group of victim, while Sussex has a ten-way; classification into type of incident is similar for each force, but not the same and not therefore easily comparable. (It is not possible to reproduce do this for the Metropolitan Police's forms as various elements of information recorded as part of the racial incident are scattered over the dozen or so pages of the standard Crime Reporting Information System.)

Undertaking the national survey brought home to us the fact that there is a large degree of variation between forces in what is actually recorded and counted. A number of forces were unable to provide us with some of the data we requested; many more found it necessary to clarify the categories we employed as the way they retained their data did not easily translate into what we were asking for.

The national survey also revealed large variations in the rate of recorded racially motivated incidents per 1000 ethnic minority population between forces which are difficult to explain without reference to consistency in recording procedures, an issue which this report has not attempted to address (for a full discussion see Sibbitt, forthcoming). These findings rather support the view that the current ACPO definition of a racial incident allows for a wide range of interpretations at force, divisional or even individual officer level. Indeed, this was one of the strands brought out by FitzGerald and Hale (1996): that many cases will not conform to a stereotypical 'white perpetrator picks (at random) a stranger victim because he or she is black' story. In many cases the motivation for an incident will not be the ethnic background of the victim, and in this sense the term racially motivated could perhaps be called into question. It appeared to us that the wide variety of circumstances that could currently be defined as racial incidents may be one cause of the discrepancies in recording and, from our in-depth look at a number of cases, was certainly the cause of wide variations in the ways in which incidents were dealt with and in charging routes.

Nevertheless, we are quite confident in saying that the bulk of racially motivated incidents are accounted for by less serious types of crime: 58% of incidents in our survey were either damage to property or verbal harassment.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We found that the evidence on charging routes and case outcomes collected as part of the national survey was corroborated by the cases we scrutinised in depth: few of these resulted in perpetrators facing formal sanction. After discounting those cases where there was little chance of identifying a suspect, only just over a third of cases with the potential to, actually resulted in a charge or a caution. The other two-thirds were disposed of by informal means, around half at the behest of the victim and the other half on the advice of the police. Clearly there is a need to address the effects of dealing with this proportion of cases informally. Issues that need to be looked at include the impact on public perceptions and on repeat offending, and whether any of these cases could have been dealt with more formally. However, this work is outside the remit of the current report. Interestingly, we came across very few cases of repeat victimisation in the cases we looked at in depth; not enough forces were able to provide us with data to be able to say very much at a national level about its incidence, although previous research (Sampson and Phillips, 1995) shows the extent to which it is underrecorded in this area.

Two divisions we visited had decided to include dealing with racially motivated incidents as a priority in their policing plans. One simply coupled divisional monitoring of reported incidents and outcomes with allocating follow-up with both perpetrators and victims to local beat officers; the other deployed officers to a full-time specialist Racial Incidents Section who carried out the investigation and follow up of every case. The data show that these two divisions were no more likely than the other three areas to have officers attending the scene suggest that an incident was racially motivated; they seemed rather less likely to bring cases to result in a prosecution or a caution. In our view the allocation of the entire investigation and follow-up to a specialist section resulted in the marginalising of racially motivated incidents from front-line officers, whereas allocating follow-up to local beat officers appeared to encourage them to sign up to this aspect of divisional priorities far more than in other areas, and is commensurate with the problem oriented policing philosophy adopted for beat and patrol officers in a number of forces.

We found that officers who had received specific training in how to handle racially motivated incidents were more aware of the available legislation, particularly section 4A of the Public Order Act. Whilst multi-cultural awareness training received a mixed response, we came to the conclusion that it had probably achieved more good than harm in that those who were hostile to it would probably have been hostile without it, whereas the genuinely open-minded had found advantage in receiving it.

We found very few officers who were completely aware of the provisions of section 4A of the Public Order Act, many being confused about what it could be used to deal with.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Half the officers thought that a new offence of racially motivated violence would be a good thing, half that it would not and that current powers in dealing with violent crime were sufficient.

Recommendations

A standard form should be introduced nationally to record racially motivated incidents in order to improve the provision of detailed nationally comparable data.

ACPO and the Home Office should consider clarifying the definition of a racially motivated incident in order to encourage less variation between forces, divisions and individual officers in what is recorded as a racial incident and what is not.

Officers must be made aware that racially motivated incidents are more likely to take the form of damage to property or verbal harassment than assaults or more serious crimes, and it is these types of incident which they should be equipped to deal with.

It is recommended that front-line police officers, their supervisors and the Crown Prosecution Service should usually, where evidence exists, charge and prosecute racially motivated incidents. It should be recognised, however, that there may be circumstances where the victim, for whatever reason, does not wish such a path to be pursued and wants the matter to be dealt with informally. It has been outside the scope of this research to evaluate the extent to which cases dealt with informally could have been dealt with more formally, regardless of the victim's wishes. Nor have we examined the relative pros and cons of formal and informal resolutions, their impact on further offending and on public perceptions of this type of incident. Certainly, police officers should not discourage victims from bringing charges in favour of administering informal warnings, particularly in cases where repeat victimisation is an issue. This is entirely commensurate with the view that incidents of racial harassment, at whatever level, will not be tolerated by the police service. It also sits well with the 'zero tolerance' approach, whereby calling a halt to what some may view as trivial incidents may well result in a reduction in the number of more serious incidents occurring. Clearly this approach may have implications for witness care which the government is currently addressing as part of the inter-departmental review of vulnerable or intimidated witnesses.

Forces or – where appropriate – divisions might consider making dealing with racially motivated incidents a priority in their policing plans. However, prioritising does not necessarily have to mean deploying a limited number of officers to full-time specialist teams, and managers should be aware of the problems which may arise if racially motivated incidents become marginalised from mainstream front-line policing.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Forces should consider instituting two types of training in this area: to explain the legislation available and the procedures employed in dealing with racially motivated incidents, and in multi-cultural awareness in order to be more cognisant of what members of particular ethnic minority groups might find offensive.

The Home Office should consider revising the current guidance relating to section 4A of the Public Order Act, to make more obvious to front-line officers the circumstances of racial verbal abuse in which it can be applied.

The Home Office should also consider carefully the wording of any new offence of racially motivated violence, or guidance relating to it, in order to address two sets of worries expressed by some of the officers interviewed: the difficulties of proving 'motivation' should not provide an opportunity for the case to be lost; and that prosecutions under the offence must be seen to be able to be brought with white as well as with ethnic minority victims. The potential difficulty of proving mitigation is recognised in the government's recent consultation paper on new statutory offences for racial crime, with the proposal that alternative verdicts should be permitted if the racial element is unproven.

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Appendix 1 – Sections 4, 4A and 5 of the 1986 Public Order Act

Section 4 of the 1986 Public Order Act covers a summary offence concerned with **fear or provocation of violence**. A person is guilty of an offence if he:

- 1 uses towards another person threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or
- 2 distributes or displays to another person any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting,

with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used against him or another. Or where unlawful violence is likely to be provoked. The offence carries a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment or a £5,000 fine, or both.

Section 4A of the POA (introduced in February 1995) covers offences of **intentional harassment**. A person is guilty of an offence if with **intent** to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress he:

- 1 uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or
- 2 displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting,

thereby causing that or other person harassment, alarm or distress. The maximum penalty is six months imprisonment or a level 5 fine (currently £5,000), or both. 'The new offence provides an appropriate penalty for cases where harassment is intentional and makes the lives of the victims extremely distressing, but which falls short of violence. The Secretary of State strongly urges chief officers to make full use of section 4A in tackling incidents of intentional harassment on the grounds of race' (Home Office circular 30/95).

Section 5 of the POA deals with **non-violent disorderly behaviour**. A person is guilty of an offence if he:

- 1 uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or
- 2 displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting,

within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress as a result. The offence carries a maximum penalty of a level 3 fine (currently £1,000).

Appendix 2: Police racial incident forms

Form F4A (5/92)

LEICESTERSHIRE CONSTABULARY
RACIAL INCIDENT FORM
INITIAL REPORT

(TO BE COMPLETED AND SUBMITTED BEFORE END OF DUTY)

Definition: A racially motivated incident is defined as:-

(i) Any incident which appears to the reporting or investigating officer that the complainant involves an element of racial motivation.

(ii) Any incident which includes an allegation of racial motivation made by any person.

THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED IN RESPECT OF ANY INCIDENT FALLING WITHIN THIS DEFINITION

1. Sub-Div _____ Ref No. _____ Beat No. _____ Crime No. _____
 Reporting Officer _____ Investigating Officer _____
 DAY, DATE & TIME OF INCIDENT _____
 Precise Location _____

2. **LOCATION OF INCIDENT** (Tick one box only)

PRIVATE DWELLING	<input type="checkbox"/>	EDUCATIONAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	IF OTHER PLEASE SPECIFY _____ _____ _____
COUNCIL DWELLING	<input type="checkbox"/>	LICENSED PREMISES	<input type="checkbox"/>	
BUSINESS	<input type="checkbox"/>	PUBLIC PLACE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
RELIGIOUS	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/>	
POLITICAL	<input type="checkbox"/>			

3. **ALLEGATION** (Tick appropriate box)

MURDER	<input type="checkbox"/>	MISSILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	IF OTHER PLEASE SPECIFY _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
GBH	<input type="checkbox"/>	SLOGAN/GRAFFITI	<input type="checkbox"/>	
ASH	<input type="checkbox"/>	VEHICLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
COMMON	<input type="checkbox"/>	CRIMINAL DAMAGE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SEXUAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPUTE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
ARSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	ABUSE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
		OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/>	

4. **VICTIM DETAILS** (Attach separate list if necessary)

A. Name _____ M/F	B. Name _____ M/F
Address _____	Address _____
_____	_____
Tel. No. _____	Tel. No. _____
Exact Date of Birth _____	Exact Date of Birth _____
Occupation _____	Occupation _____
School (if Juvenile) _____	School (if Juvenile) _____
Ethnic Categorisation _____	Ethnic Categorisation _____

1. White skinned European 2. Dark skinned European 3. Afro Caribbean 4. Indian/Pakistan
 5. Oriental 6. Arab 7. Other

5. VICTIMS PERCEPTION OF ETHNICITY OF ALLEGED OFFENDER(S)
Record Numbers of Offenders, Ethnicity and Age Range – i.e. 5 White Male Adults.

6. Brief Circumstances of Incident

Who is alleging the incident is racial? VICTIM/POLICE/OTHER
 Indicate ONE group only
 If other person, give details and relationship to victim

7. DISTRIBUTION

A Reporting Officer's Comments _____

Signed _____ Dated _____

B Supervisor's Comments _____

TENSION INDICATOR YES/NO Signed _____ Dated _____

C Community Unit Comments _____

Signed _____ Dated _____

D Sub-Div. Commander's Comments _____

Signed _____ Dated _____

SUB-DIVISIONAL COMMANDER'S LETTER SENT TO VICTIM YES/NO

A) Reporting Officer to submit to supervisor before end of duty.

DISTRIBUTION B) Supervisor to submit to Community Unit within 24 hours.

ACTION C) Community Unit to monitor and submit copies to CAD.
 Supervise submission of F4B within 14 days.

D) All papers to Sub-Divisional Commander.

<p>NOTTINGHAMSHIRE CONSTABULARY</p> <p>RACIAL INCIDENT FORM – INITIAL REPORT</p> <p>TO BE COMPLETED AND SUBMITTED BEFORE END OF DUTY</p>	<p>G.188(X) (Rev. March 2009)</p> <p>Divisional Const. No. _____</p> <p>Date Reported _____</p>
<p>Where this form is completed, officers should ensure that all available evidence of racial motivation is collected, in addition to the evidence that is necessary to establish the components of any offence.</p>	
<p>ONE</p> <p>Division _____ Crime Number _____</p> <p>Reporting Officer _____ Investigating Officer _____</p> <p>DAY, DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT _____</p> <p>Precise Location (include type of premises) _____</p>	
<p>TWO</p> <p>ALLEGATION (Tick one or more boxes)</p> <p>Arson (or attempt) <input type="checkbox"/> Other Damage <input type="checkbox"/> Assault S.18 or 20 <input type="checkbox"/> Other Assault <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Verbal or Written Abuse <input type="checkbox"/> Nuisance <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> (Specify) _____</p>	
<p>THREE</p> <p>Victim's Name _____ Age _____ Date of Birth _____ Sex M/F _____</p> <p>Address _____</p> <p>Post Code _____ Tel _____</p> <p>Occupation _____ School (if applicable) _____</p> <p>White <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Asian <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Specify _____ previous incidents? (if yes show dates) _____</p> <p>Additional victims to be included on additional sheets _____</p>	
<p>FOUR</p> <p>Brief Description of Circumstances _____</p> <p>Gender & Ethnic origin of offender-White <input type="checkbox"/> Black <input type="checkbox"/> Asian <input type="checkbox"/> NIK <input type="checkbox"/> Other specify _____ M/F _____</p> <p>Detected YES/NO _____</p> <p>Who initially alleged the incident to be racial (tick one only) Victim <input type="checkbox"/> Police <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Reporting Officer's Signature _____ Date Submitted _____</p>	
<p>FIVE Distribution</p> <p>Duty Inspector's Comments (all copies) _____</p> <p>Signed _____ Date _____ TENSION INDICATOR YES/NO _____</p> <p style="text-align: center;">if "Yes" enter in Div. Log.</p> <p>Div. Commander's Comments (Top and Second copy only) _____</p> <p>Signed _____ Date _____</p>	

P.T.O

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